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Abstract: In this paper, we study designing and managing effective dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model to 
optimize the profit of each node in dual-channel supply chain network and satisfy seamlessly customer demand. The 
customer demand in each channel is driven by the heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes. In our proposed model, 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) function is used to make a purchase decision for customers considering selling price, operation 
time and retail services. Furthermore, the Variational Inequality is used to express the equilibrium solution in dual-channel 
supply chain network. A numerical example in dual-channel supply chain network is presented to show the MNL function 
can be a good replacement for the demand function when customers are heterogeneous and the proposed model can be 
helpful to avoid time trap. 
 
Keywords: Dual-channel supply chain network, Network Equilibrium Model, Variational Inequalities, Modified Projection 
Method 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Avoiding loss affected by “channel conflict” in dual-channel supply chain (SC) and dual-channel supply 
chain network (SCN) is challenging for firms who need to optimize selling price, processing time and service in 
dual-channel markets with heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes. The operations of dual-channel 
SCN not only affect people’s lives, but also the firms’ profitability in SCN. Some manufacturers even have 
switched into single-channel SC from dual-channel SC in order to avoid this kind of channel conflict
[1]
, while 
others have tried to implement differentiation strategy in dual-channel SC. 
Dual-channel SC has increasingly attracted interest in recent literature. Pricing strategy in dual-channel SC 
is one of the key issues that previous research focus on. Considering channel control, Chiang et al.
[2]
 construct a 
price-setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer. Chun and Kim
[3]
 analyze the price 
differences between a retailer channel and a direct online channel. Chen et al.
[4]
 examine a manufacturer’s 
pricing strategies in a dual-channel SC and illustrate how a contract enables both the manufacturer and the 
retailer to be a win-win. Moreover, pricing strategies model of dual-channel SC has been developed for various 
characteristics and types SC, including risk management
[5]
, retail service
[6]
, price discounts
[7]
, brand 
management
[8]
, information sharing
[9]
, inventory management
[10]
, lead time management
[11],[12]
, and quality 
management
[13]
. However, the aforementioned papers just considered the pricing issue and did not address the 
importance of customer choice based on the heterogeneous characteristic attributes. In our model, different 
choices from heterogenous customers in the characteristics of products is the driving force of forming 
dual-channel SC. 
As noted in Nagurney et al.
[14]
, time plays a critical role in time-sensitive products SC. Time is a 
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fundamental element in dual-channel SC which customers care. In many papers, operation time is an significant 
factor that impact product quality
[15],[16]
, waste of products
[17]
 and lost value
[18]
. These studies focused on the 
importance of operation time in SC and the benefit followed operation time control. For the various type of 
products in our model, customers care different operation time combinations, including production time, 
delivery time and retail time in practice.  
Our study builds upon earlier SCN equilibrium research and makes some new contributions. First, we 
develop a network equilibrium model for dual-channel SCN. On the one hand, because most of the models 
focused on intra-SC competition, there is little work that studies the competition among dual-channel SCs. On 
the other hand, competition is no longer between stand-alone companies, but rather SC against SC
[19]
. The 
strategies in a dual-channel SC were impacted by competing and cooperating SC. Second, selling prices, 
operation time and retail service are used as the key characteristics of products in dual-channel SCN. Consumer 
choices on selling price, operation time and retail service are driven by the consumer characteristic attributes. 
By accounting for consumer-driven time and service competition, we can address a deeper understanding of 
time and service competition in dual-channel SCN, which allows managers to evaluate the time and service 
competition decision from consumer’s perspective in dual-channel SCN and implement a discrete choice model 
to support their decentralized decisions. Next, ignoring consumers’ preferences and needs, Stalk and Webber[20] 
reported many firms found themselves caught in a time trap. MNL function, as a discrete choice model, is 
developed to understand consumer purchase decisions among selling price, operation time and retail service 
based on the consumer characteristic attributes in dual-channel SCN. Finally, shoes were used as a 
representative example in dual-channel SCN. 
 
2. DUAL-CHANNEL SCN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
In this section, we develop a dual-channel SC network equilibrium model for manufacturers, retailers and 
customers in markets including the costs associated with the production, transportation, marketing, storage, and 
retail service. The decision-makers in the SCN, specifically the manufacturers and retailers, are assumed to seek 
profit maximization considering the operation time and retail service. In view of consumer characteristic 
attributes among price time and retail service, the consumers in the market make their own decisions in 
accordance with their preference and utility. A typical dual-channel SC structure is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. A typical dual-channel SC structure. 
More than two dual-channel SCs form a dual-channel SCN. We designate   product manufacturers, a 
typical manufacturer is called   who transports its products to   demand markets by direct channel, a typical 
market is called   (Figure 2). In the traditional channel, manufacturer   will sell and delivery part of products 
to retailer   at first. Then, retailer   will sell the products to demand markets in the end and provide 
additional retail service for customers using traditional channel. In this scenario, according to consumer 
preference between selling price, time and retail service, there are two options for consumers to select: direct 
channel and traditional channel. 
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Consider a general network with time attribute          , where   denotes the set of nodes in the 
network,   denotes the set of directed links and    denotes the set of operation time on directed links. The 
links between node   and node   can be production and transaction from manufacturer   to retailer  . The 
links between node   and node   can be the transaction from retailer   to market  . The links between 
node   and node   can be the production and transaction from manufacturer   to market   by direct 
channel or 3PL service. 
 
Figure 2. A typical dual-channel SCN structure. 
In this paper, we assume the process of production, transportation and marketing is assumed to be acyclic. 
We suppose that the firms in SC compete and cooperate in a selling season. Different from the definition of a 
general operation time on links directly, similar to that in[21], we divide the operation time in dual-channel SC 
into 3 types, (           ) according to customer preference and product characteristics. The operation time 
(   ) between manufacturers and retailers includes production time, storage time and delivery time so on. The 
operation time (   ) between retailers and demand markets includes storage time and delivery time so on. The 
operation time (   ) between manufacturers and demand markets includes production time, storage time and 
delivery time so on. Operation time in dual-channel SC is a key factor that customers care. For example, In a 
fashion clothing or a book dual-channel SCN, customers balance between     and    . In a customized 
products dual-channel SCN, customers trade-off between     and        . Usually the operation time   
between a manufacturer and a marketplace is easy for consumers to get from the external packing of part 
products in supermarkets or to percept after making an order. 
Definition I: The variational inequality problem 
The variational inequality problem. The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem,         , is to 
determine a vector,        , such that 
      
         
                      (1) 
Where                         
  
    
   
      is the feasible set of chain variables for the SCN in 
our model.   is a given continuous function from   to   ,   is a given closed convex set, and       denotes 
the inner product in n dimensional Euclidean space.    is a network economic equilibrium if and only if    
satisfies (1)
[22]
. 
 
2.1 The equilibrium conditions for manufacturers 
The transaction between manufacturer   and retailer   is a solid arrow line in Fig. 2. The transaction 
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between manufacturer   and demand market   is denoted by dotted arrow lines in Fig. 2. The production 
output of manufacturer   satisfies the conservation of product flow equation (2). The production output of 
manufacturer   is equal to the sum of the quantities sent from manufacturer   to all retailers and all customers 
through all delivery methods. Here we assume that each manufacturer has a production cost function   . 
  =  
 
   
     
 
   
                 (2) 
                            (3) 
The transaction cost between manufacturer   and retailer  , as well as the transaction cost between 
manufacturer   and consumers in market  , include the transportation cost and insurance cost which depends 
on the volume of product flow between the two nodes. The transaction costs are given by: 
                                        (4) 
The operation time     between manufacturer   and retailer  , including production time and 
transportation time are related to the relevant transaction cost. In our model, manufacturer   provides   
operation time options associated with different cost functions. 
                            (5) 
Every manufacturer goes for profit maximization. So, the profit of manufacturer   is equal to the price 
   
  that manufacturer   charges for the product multiplied by the volume of product shipping to all retailers, 
with the addition of the price    
  that manufacturer   charges for the products multiplied by the volume of 
product shipping to all consumers in markets, minus the production cost and transaction cost. The function of 
profit maximization for manufacturer   can be expressed as: 
max  
 
   
   
       
 
   
   
              
 
   
          
 
   
            (6) 
                                  (7) 
 
2.2 The equilibrium conditions for retailers 
The transaction cost between retailer   and customers in market   may include transportation, display, 
and storage costs associated with these products. There is only a delivery way between retailers and customers 
in markets, which is a solid arrow line in Figure 2. Let     and    
  respectively denote a transaction cost 
function and retail service cost between retailers   and customers in market  .     is a function of     and 
   
  is a function of retail service    . The transaction cost function and retail service cost function, then, can 
be expressed as: 
                               (8) 
   
     
                          (9) 
The operation time     between retailers   and customers in market   is related to the relevant 
transaction cost, too. Assuming that every retailer is a profit-maximizer, the profit of retailer   is equal to the 
price    
  that retailer   charges for the products multiplied by the volume of the products shipping to all 
customers, minus the transaction cost and retail service cost. The function of profit maximization for retailer   
can be expressed as: 
max  
 
   
   
       
 
   
          
 
   
   
        
 
   
   
           (10) 
     
 
   
     
 
   
                        (11) 
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2.3 The behavior of consumers in markets 
Suppose that there are   products in dual-channel SCN. Let   
   denote the price of product   on market 
 . We assume that the prices of all market   are transparent for all consumers, because the Internet has 
changed the way to obtain price information[23]. In point of price, the consumers take the price charged by a 
retailer   
 , or the price charged by a manufacturer   
 , into consideration. The price will not exceed the price 
that the consumers in markets are willing to pay for the product. The equilibrium conditions in markets take the 
following forms: 
For all manufacturers              
    
  
      
          
    
  
      
          
  ＝ 
              (12a) 
For all retailers              
  
  
      
          
    
  
      
          
  ＝ 
              (12b) 
Customers in our model are assumed to be heterogeneous. Some consumers care more about operation time 
or retail service of goods than price, others vice versa. Suppose that customers are statistically identical and 
independent. In our study, we view the same product with distinctive characteristics attribute as variants. Let 
     denote the probability of the consumers choosing variant            The utility function that customers 
choose variant   is a linear random utility model (LRUM)[24]. 
                                      (13) 
Where         is the product’s characteristics attributes vector, including consumer’s valuation, selling price, 
operation time and retail service of variant, denoted respectively by        . In this expression     is called 
idiosyncratic taste differences of consumers and uncertainty which cannot be observed.     are i.i.d. and 
follow a double exponential distribution with mean zero. The exponential, the double exponential and the 
Gumbel distributions were verified well to satisfy the requirements[25],[26]. 
Let     (     ) denote the customer’s sensitivity coefficients that are nonnegative absolutely continuous 
random variables expressing the consumer’s preference[24], including price sensitivity coefficient, time 
sensitivity coefficient and retail service sensitivity coefficient computed by using maximum-likelihood 
estimation (MLE), respectively. The probability of choosing alternative (   ) out of a total alternative of is: 
           
 
       
   
 
   
 
       
                          (14) 
The probability of a consumer rejecting all variants options is             . If      are estimated according 
to customer choices in   variants, the likelihood ( ) is given as 
            
 
   
           
  
 
   
 
          
  ,         (15) 
Then we solve the optimal      for           which maximizes          . 
If the equilibrium price the consumers are willing to pay is positive, the shipments from retailers and 
manufacturers must be equal to the demand for the products of consumers. 
             
 
 
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
       
       
  
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
       
       
         (16) 
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2.4 The equilibrium conditions of the dual-channel SCN 
The manufacturers and retailers are assumed to compete in a noncooperative fashion. It is also assumed 
that the production cost functions and the transaction cost functions for each manufacturer and retailer are 
continuous and convex. The optimization function (6) for all manufacturers, the optimization function (10) 
subject to (11) for all retailers and functions (12), (16) can be expressed as the following variational 
inequality[26],[28]-[31].[29],[30],[31]. 
 
 
   
 
      
  
   
        
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
        
  
    
   
           
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
        
  
    
   
        
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
        
  
    
   
    
           
    
 
   
 
 
   
 
    
     
  
    
          
    
 
   
  
 
   
    
 
 
   
        
    
     
 
   
  
 
   
                     
    
     
 
   
  
 
   
                     
  
  
                   
         
.   (17) 
The term   
  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (11) for retailer  . The term   
  is the 
Lagrange multiplier for customers in market  . The production quantity and shipments that the manufacturers 
send to the retailers must be equal to the production quantity and shipments that the retailers accept from the 
manufacturers. The amount of product purchased by the customers must be equal to the shipments that the 
customers accept from the retailers and manufacturers. We state the equilibrium conditions of the whole 
dual-channel SCN as a variational inequality formulation. 
 
3. ALGORITHM AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this section, the algorithm that we use for the computation of the product equilibrium pattern satisfying 
variational inequality (17) is the Projection Method[32],[31]. Then we present one example of dual-channel SCN in 
disparate geographic areas, specifically, SCN for shoes. 
The example is developed for shoes dual-channel SCN. There are two retailers in two markets who 
purchase shoes shipped from two manufacturers. Two manufacturers ship shoes to these retailers and customers 
in two demand markets, in which the populations are       10000, respectively (Figure 3). The two 
manufacturers are designed to offer two different strategies to satisfy heterogeneous customers with different 
requirements: online direct channel and traditional retail channel. 
 
Figure 3. The shoe SCN structure. 
The relative data of example are given in table 1. The retailer service cost function is given:    
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      [33]. The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB R2017a (step length        , convergence 
precision        ,      ). 
Table 1. Cost functions and time required in this shoes dual-channel SCN. 
SC 1 SC 2 
Time Cost Time Cost 
                          
                                          
                                      
                                  
                                  
Considering 2 different cases, we respectively generate the sales record of 400 heterogeneous customers to 
estimate the consumer’s valuation,    , price sensitivity coefficient    , time sensitivity coefficient     and 
retail service sensitivity coefficient     for each demand market. We test 2 cases where the customers are 
heterogeneous follow the under distributions. Each case has a special consumer’s valuation, or high price 
sensitivity or high retail service sensitivity. 
Case 1: The customers are heterogeneous in  ,   and  , i.e.,    ,                 ,   
               and                 . 
Case 2: The customers are heterogeneous in  ,   and  , i.e.,             ,                 , 
                 and                 . 
These two cases are used to simulate the implement of our dual-channel network equilibrium model when 
the firms face heterogeneous customers in practice. At first, we use the method introduced in section 2.3 to 
estimate consumer’s valuation, price sensitivity coefficient, time sensitivity coefficient and retail service 
sensitivity coefficient. The coefficients that we estimated using MLE are shown in table 2. Then, we use the 
coefficients in table 2 to compute the equilibrium flow and price for each case. 
Table 2.     estimated by MLE with MNL. 
Coefficient Demand market         
Case 1 
1 0.9892 0.0516 0.0494 0.0494 
2 0.9876 0.0513 0.0482 0.0482 
Case 2 
1 0.9779 0.0534 0.0479 0.0679 
2 0.9859 0.0524 0.0492 0.0692 
For the network and cost structure of the shoes dual-channel SCN given above, assume that the utility function 
at markets,                           . Then, the equilibrium is computed in table 3. 
Table 3. Computed equilibrium values on links (       ,         ). 
Results 
                
                                                                        
Case 1 5522.0 6482.6 2015.8 576.5 1055.3 2356.2 1464.8 1464.8 1535.5 1535.5 24.0 24.7 24.2 24.9 39 39 39 39 
Case 2 5346.1 6655.6 2188.2 224.0 878.7 2710.0 1467.0 1467.0 1533.4 1533.4 35.8 36.9 36.7 37.8 42 42 42 42 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Dual-channel SCN is facing many problems such as low logistics efficiency, long transportation time and 
channel conflict. All these problems are required to be solved by a systematic and intelligent network [34]. The 
tool and method of designing and managing effective dual-channel SCN would be beneficial to firms and 
consumers in dual-channel SCN. In this paper, a dual-channel SCN equilibrium model with customer-driven 
was developed considering heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes, which is comprised of multiple 
product manufacturers, retailers and customers in competing markets. We began by considering operation time 
on links associated with different transaction cost and retail service. Next, a discrete choice model was designed 
to illustrate the customer choice from consumer-driven perspective in competing markets where the consumers 
make decisions among selling price, operation time and retail service according to their characteristic attributes. 
Furthermore, a finite-dimensional variational inequality was adopted to formulate the dual-channel SCN 
equilibrium conditions. Finally, a numerical example was provided to illustrate the model and the computational 
procedure. 
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